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POWERFUL SPEAKERS AND  
THEIR LISTENERS 
HELEN NORTON* 
Sometimes speakers prefer to tell lies when their listeners 
thirst for the truth: think of a huckster who falsely claims to 
potential buyers that his jalopy gets forty miles to the gallon. 
Listeners may hope that speakers will reveal their secrets 
while those speakers at times resist disclosure—consider here 
the worker who wonders what her co-workers are paid while 
her employer jealously guards that information. And at still 
other times, speakers seek to address certain listeners when 
those listeners long to be left alone, as anyone on the wrong 
end of a telemarketer’s call can attest. When speakers’ and 
listeners’ First Amendment interests collide, whose interests 
should prevail?1 
Law sometimes—but not always—puts listeners’ interests 
first in settings where those listeners have less information or 
power than speakers. This “listener-centered” approach under-
stands the First Amendment to permit the government to regu-
late the speech of comparatively knowledgeable or powerful 
speakers when that expression frustrates their listeners’ auton-
 
* Professor and Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr. Chair in Constitutional Law, University of 
Colorado School of Law. Thanks to Jessica Reed-Baum and Jonathan Smith for 
outstanding research assistance; to Margot Kaminski, Craig Konnoth, Scott 
Skinner-Thompson, Blake Reid, and the participants at the 2018 Rothgerber 
Constitutional Law Conference on “Listeners and the First Amendment” for their 
thoughtful comments; and to the University of Colorado Law Review for excellent 
editorial support. 
 1. See OWEN FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 3 (1996) (observing that some 
free speech theories are “unable to explain why the interests of speakers should 
take priority over the interests of those individuals who are discussed in the 
speech, or who must listen to the speech, when those two sets of interests 
conflict”); Leslie Kendrick, Are Speech Rights for Speakers?, 103 VA. L. REV. 1767, 
1798 (2017) (“Recognizing both speakers’ and listeners’ rights makes cases more 
complex and possibly creates divergent outcomes.”). And while listeners seek 
liberty from deception or coercion by comparatively powerful speakers, powerful 
speakers in turn may seek liberty from the government’s interference with their 
expressive choices. See GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 194 (1966) (explaining that freedom from regulation by the 
government “may enlarge the freedom of the powerful, but it may also diminish 
the freedom of the weak”). 
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omy, enlightenment, and self-governance interests—values at 
the heart of the Free Speech Clause.2 Under a listener-centered 
approach, the government can, for instance, prohibit those 
speakers from lying to their listeners or from accosting their 
listeners with unwelcome speech, even when the speakers 
would prefer otherwise. 
Why put listeners’ interests first in these relationships of 
expressive inequality?3 When speakers enjoy advantages of 
information or power over their listeners, their speech can 
more readily harm their listeners through deception or 
coercion. In other words, they can mislead or muscle their 
listeners in ways that strike us as unfair and sometimes 
dangerous. A speaker engages in deception when she tries to 
make her listener believe x when she knows that x is not true. 
A speaker can seek to deceive her listener through lies and 
material omissions: the less access to information the listener 
has, the more difficult to identify and counter the speaker’s 
efforts to deceive. In contrast, a speaker engages in coercion 
when he uses or threatens force or power to pressure his 
listener to choose y when the listener might otherwise choose z. 
Examples of coercion include a speaker’s threats to punish his 
listeners’ resistance to his message—threats that become more 
credible when the speaker holds physical, economic, or legal 
power over his listeners. A speaker can also coerce his listeners 
by hectoring them while “captive” until they abandon their 
 
 2. ROBERT POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 6 (2012) (explaining the 
three major purposes of the First Amendment as furthering individual autonomy 
and self-fulfillment, advancing knowledge and discovering truth, and facilitating 
democratic self-governance). 
 3. I discussed the value of a listener-centered approach to certain First 
Amendment problems in earlier work. See Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the 
Workplace: Employer Speech and the First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 31 
(2016) [hereinafter Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace] (proposing a 
listener-centered approach to employers’ speech to workers); Helen Norton, 
Secrets, Lies, and Disclosures, 27 J.L. & POL. 641 (2012) (proposing a listener-
centered approach to disclosure law); see also Toni M. Massaro & Helen Norton, 
Siri-ously? Free Speech Rights for Artificial Intelligence, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1169 
(2016) (suggesting the value of a listener-centered approach to the free speech 
problems posed by the speech of artificial intelligence). This work in turn built on 
that of the many thoughtful commentators who have considered related issues. 
E.g., Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the 
Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771 (1999); Burt 
Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital Markets, 
55 BROOK. L. REV. 5 (1989). 
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opposition to his message. A speaker can sometimes both 
deceive and coerce his listeners—for instance, by lying to them 
when they are captive or otherwise subject to his control. 
When we take the side of listeners in these relationships—
that is, when we require more of speakers when their listeners 
lack information or power—we improve the quality of the com-
municative discourse. More specifically, we promote listeners’ 
First Amendment interests when we enable them to receive ac-
curate information that informs, but does not coerce, their deci-
sion-making. We also achieve related moral goals: in Kantian 
terms, we recognize listeners as ends in themselves rather than 
as mere means through which powerful speakers seek to 
achieve their own ends.4 
In this Essay, I explore and defend listener-centered 
approaches to a variety of First Amendment problems. In Part 
I, I identify the dynamics of certain environments in which 
speakers’ and listeners’ First Amendment interests collide. 
More specifically, I list a number of ways in which speakers 
sometimes enjoy advantages of information or power (or both) 
over their listeners, thus enhancing their ability to deceive or 
coerce those listeners. In Part II, I describe how law can 
address these inequalities. In particular, law can forbid comp-
aratively knowledgeable or powerful speakers from lying to 
their listeners, it can require those speakers to make truthful 
disclosures to their listeners, and it can bar those speakers (as 
well as the government) from coercing their listeners. I then 
consider how these approaches do, or could, work in various 
speaker-listener relationships. First Amendment law some-
times takes a listener-centered approach; this has been the 
case, as we’ll see, in commercial and professional speech 
 
 4. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 63–
65 (James W. Ellington trans., 3d ed. 1993) (1785) (explaining that lies are 
morally wrong when speakers undermine listener autonomy by seeking to use 
their listeners as a means to the speakers’ own ends, rather than treating 
listeners as ends in themselves); see also BERNARD WILLIAMS, TRUTH & 
TRUTHFULNESS 117 (2002) (“[W]e want to believe that what people deserve or are 
owed is determined not by considerations of social positions but, at the most basic 
levels of morality from a position of equality.”). We can also advance related 
instrumental goals when we empower comparatively disadvantaged listeners. See 
ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 286 (1991) (“[L]aws that serve to 
distribute power more broadly and equally are likely to bolster informal-control 
systems. For example, when lawmakers succeed in equalizing power within 
relationships such as landlord-tenant and husband-wife, they make it easier for 
those involved to work out problems informally.”). 
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settings. I suggest that we should extend a listener-centered 
approach to other communicative relationships of inequality: 
employers’ speech to workers about the terms and conditions of 
employment, and service providers’ speech to women seeking 
reproductive health care. In Part III, I flag some questions and 
challenges for further discussion. Although a listener-centered 
approach doesn’t solve all free speech problems, it offers a 
valuable perspective for thinking about some of them—and, in 
so doing, it forces us to think hard about whether and when 
law and policy should respond to expressive inequalities. 
I. INEQUALITIES OF INFORMATION AND POWER 
First Amendment theory and doctrine generally presume 
that “public discourse”—the universe of speech key to demo-
cratic self-governance and thus the most rigorously protected 
from government regulation—occurs in a relationship of equal-
ity in which we celebrate (and thus privilege) speakers’ auton-
omy interest in saying what they want to say.5 But, as Robert 
Post explains, expressive settings outside of public discourse 
may involve inequalities between speakers and listeners that 
invite, if not require, an emphasis on listeners’ interests: 
Whereas within public discourse the political imperatives of 
democracy require that persons be regarded as equal and as 
autonomous, outside public discourse the law commonly 
regards persons as dependent, vulnerable, and hence un-
equal. Clients are legally entitled to rely on the advice of 
their lawyers, consumers on the representations of manu-
facturers, shareholders on the information of corporations. 
That is why law holds lawyers accountable for malpractice, 
manufacturers for the failure to warn, and corporations for 
misrepresentation. Within public discourse, by contrast, the 
 
 5. See POST, supra note 2, at 21 (“Within public discourse, the First 
Amendment protects the autonomy of speakers, not merely the rights of 
audiences. If persons within public discourse are prevented from choosing what to 
communicate or not to communicate, the value of democratic legitimation will not 
be served. Persons will not experience participation in public discourse as a means 
of making government responsive to their own personal views.”); Jack M. Balkin, 
Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1185, 
1214 (2016) (“[W]hat falls within public discourse and what falls outside of it does 
not depend on the content of the speech. Rather, it depends on a characterization 
of social relationships.”). 
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First Amendment ascribes autonomy equally to speakers 
and to their audience, so that the rule of caveat emptor 
applies. This contrast is quite stark, and it is the single 
most salient pattern of entrenched First Amendment 
doctrine.6 
In this Essay, I focus on a variety of situations outside of 
public discourse in which speakers enjoy advantages of infor-
mation or power (or both) over their listeners in ways threaten-
ing to listeners’ interests in self-realization, enlightenment, 
and democratic self-governance.7 
 
 6. POST, supra note 2, at 23; see also Balkin, supra note 5, at 1215 (“But 
when people engage in speech that is not characterized as part of public discourse, 
the First Amendment treats their behavior quite differently. Outside of the realm 
of public discourse, the law drops its assumption that everyone is equally able, 
independent, and knowledgeable, and that everyone can equally fend for 
themselves.”). For this reason, the majority in Citizens United v. FEC was 
describing its doctrine specifically in the realm of public discourse when it 
asserted that “the First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of 
political speech based on the speaker’s identity.” 558 U.S. 310, 350 (2010). In 
other settings, courts have long treated certain speakers differently based on their 
expression’s differing potential for value and for harm; examples include not only 
commercial and professional speakers, but also students, prisoners, and public 
employees. See id. at 393 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 7. I put aside for now longstanding and important debates over whether the 
equality of speakers and listeners within public discourse is more presumed than 
realized. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 143, 155–58 (2010) (explaining that the majority and the dissent in 
Citizens United agreed that political expression’s primary First Amendment value 
is to inform listeners as voters, but that they disagreed over the question whether 
unfettered corporate political speech is valuable or instead dangerous to such 
listeners). To be sure, some argue that we can and should require more of 
powerful speakers even in public discourse. See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS 
THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 133 (1996) (“To the extent that 
political struggle takes place on the basis of deliberation rather than of power, it 
is more evenly matched. The deliberative playing field is more nearly level. Moral 
appeals are the weapon of the weak—not the only weapon, to be sure, but one that 
by its nature gives them an advantage over the powerful.”); RON LEVY & GRAEME 
ORR, THE LAW OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 101 (2016) (“Informed deliberation 
in politics, being a collective and shared activity, is surely no less important than 
informed deliberation over consumption. . . . [T]he more that politics is practised 
via sophisticated marketing techniques, the more we might want to subject it to 
ethical standards similar to those of corporate speech.”); BURT NEUBORNE, 
MADISON’S MUSIC: ON READING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 117 (2015) (urging a 
“hearer-centered” approach to corporate speech that would include “limits on the 
corporate electoral speech that currently forces hearers to absorb massive 
amounts of corporate propaganda that they do not wish to hear”). 
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A. Inequalities of Information 
Some speakers benefit from what Kim Lane Scheppele 
calls “[s]tructurally unequal access to information,” which “oc-
curs when one actor can obtain information more easily than 
another actor can—and can do so because she holds some spe-
cial position that provides a shortcut, as it were, to find out the 
information.”8 Speakers enjoy informational advantages over 
their listeners for various reasons: for example, when speakers 
themselves produce information, when speakers acquire infor-
mation through specialized training or experience, or when the 
law empowers speakers to hold monopoly or near-monopoly 
control of information. The less access to information the lis-
tener has in these relationships, the more difficult to identify 
and counter a speaker’s efforts to deceive. 
1. Information Created by the Speaker 
Sometimes speakers possess more information than their 
listeners because they generate (and keep) key information 
themselves. Think of commercial actors’ speech to consumers: 
commercial actors know more than anyone else about the prod-
ucts and services they offer for others to buy. They know more 
about their benefits and advantages; they also know more 
about their limitations, shortcomings, and even dangers.9 
 
 8. KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE 
COMMON LAW 120 (1988); see also id. at 121 (“In addition, the two actors may not 
be equally capable of making the effort required to find the information. This une-
qual capacity can occur because one actor (1) does not even know that the 
knowledge exists to be sought out while the other does (the problem of deep 
secrets), (2) has fewer resources—and so cannot invest what it takes to acquire 
the information while the other can (the problem of economic inequality), or (3) 
has less intellectual ability or social experience to begin with and so is unequally 
matched with more savvy partners (the problem of unequal facility).”). Elsewhere 
I have discussed Professor Scheppele’s work to describe how employers and 
workers have structurally unequal access to knowledge about the terms and 
conditions of employment in ways that justify imposing duties of honesty and 
accuracy upon employers’ speech to workers. Helen Norton, Employers’ Duties of 
Honesty and Accuracy, 21 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 575, 578 (2017). 
 9. Contract and commercial law often regulate speech to address these sorts 
of asymmetries between transactional parties; examples include the doctrines of 
unconscionability and adhesion. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of 
Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139, 150 (2005) (explaining how contract 
law corrects for inequality in parties’ bargaining power); Andrew Tutt, 
Commoditized Speech, “Bargain Fairness,” and the First Amendment, 2017 BYU 
L. REV. 117, 149 (2017) (describing contract law’s content-based regulation of 
NORTON_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 3/1/2019  10:10 AM 
2019] POWERFUL SPEAKERS AND THEIR LISTENERS 447 
2. Information Acquired by the Speaker’s Training or 
Experience 
Sometimes speakers know more than their listeners be-
cause of their greater training or expertise. Illustrations here 
include medical, legal, and other experts’ speech to their pa-
tients or clients about the options available for treating a 
health condition or resolving a legal dispute, as well as those 
options’ potential risks and rewards.10 Relatedly, sometimes 
speakers acquire more experience with, and thus perhaps so-
phistication about, certain matters or processes.11 For instance, 
because an employer with many employees over a long period 
of time must repeatedly navigate the substance as well as the 
process of employment law, she frequently possesses more 
knowledge about workplace law than does an individual 
worker.12 
 
transactional speech as seeking “to level the bargaining positions of the parties 
and thereby help individuals to obtain a better deal in circumstances of significant 
information asymmetry”); see also CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE 
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 34 (1993) (“We might conclude that the New Dealers 
were trying to regulate speech in order to protect the deliberative autonomy of 
everyone involved. They sought to do this by limiting certain forms of coercion and 
deception that had otherwise been made possible by law. Restrictions on the 
sharp or coercive practices of people who sell securities, food and drugs, or who 
manage broadcasting stations, might well promote the system of free 
expression.”). 
 10. See Claudia Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1271 (2016) 
(“The professional relationship is typically characterized by an asymmetry of 
knowledge. The client seeks the professional’s advice precisely because of this 
asymmetry. . . . This is not unique to the learned professions. As Kathleen 
Sullivan pointed out, ‘Lawyers know far more about law than their clients, but 
information asymmetry creates moral hazards (such as the incentive to lie about 
the gravity of a problem) for auto mechanics as well.’” (quoting Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, The Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal Profession: Constraints on 
Lawyers’ First Amendment Rights, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 569, 580 (1998))). 
 11. See Marc Galanter, Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 98–99 (1974) (explaining that 
repeat players “having done it before, have advance intelligence” as well as more 
“opportunities to develop informal relationship with institutional incumbents”); 
Haupt, supra note 10, at 1268 (“[E]xtensive psychological research on the part of 
advertisers makes the speaker and the listener unequal. . . . Product placement, 
subconscious messaging and the like give a distinct advantage to commercial 
speakers over their audiences. The Court may have originally had it right in 
assuming the vulnerability of consumers, though not for the consumers’ ‘lack of 
sophistication,’ but for the advertisers’ overabundance of it.”). 
 12. See Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace, supra note 3, at 62–63. 
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3. Information Over Which the Law Gives the 
Speaker a Monopoly 
Sometimes law encourages and protects speakers’ exclu-
sive access to information: in other words, if knowledge is pow-
er, then law sometimes makes speakers more powerful. For 
example, property law affords employers and other commercial 
actors with legal control over access to their property, which in 
turn empowers them to control access to information about 
what happens on that property.13 They thus know more about 
their workplace and manufacturing conditions than anyone 
else because they have the power to exclude others from obser-
ving those conditions firsthand. 
B. Inequalities of Power 
At times listeners lack power as well as (or instead of) 
information. Again, the reasons for power differentials vary, 
and here too these inequalities exacerbate the harms of coer-
cion and deception that speakers can inflict upon listeners. 
1. Listeners’ Vulnerability to Speakers in 
Relationships of Trust 
Listeners suffer from power disadvantages when they 
choose to entrust speakers with sensitive information and the 
authority to make important decisions.14 Fiduciary law ad-
dresses many of these relationships of trust, dependence, and 
vulnerability.15 As Deborah DeMott explains: 
 
 13. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 39 (“In a system of property rights, there 
is (I repeat) no such thing as ‘no regulation’ of speech; property rights inevitably 
allow property owners to exclude prospective speakers. The question is what 
forms of regulation best serve the purposes of the free speech guarantee.”). 
 14. See Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy 
Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, 450 (2016) (“When trusters entrust information 
about themselves, they make themselves vulnerable. Their vulnerability might in-
clude increased risk of information misuse, unauthorized disclosure, 
manipulation, or loss of autonomy.”). 
 15. See Ethan J. Lieb & Stephen R. Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory: A 
Critique, 125 YALE L.J. 1820, 1826 (2016) (“At least three general indicia charac-
terize fiduciary relationships: discretion, trust, and vulnerability. In relationships 
exhibiting these indicia, a fiduciary is subject to specific duties—usually duties of 
loyalty and care—that govern her actions on behalf of the beneficiary.”). 
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Fiduciary relationships stem from or create disparities of 
power and information, such that the relationship’s benefi-
ciary is or becomes vulnerable to the actor who occupies the 
fiduciary role. Such relationships require or engender trust 
by the beneficiary with a correlative potential for abuse by 
the fiduciary, often—but not necessarily—effected through 
deceptive or disingenuous means.16 
Professionals speak to their patients and clients in these sorts 
of relationships, as their listeners entrust them with confiden-
tial information and rely on their advice to make important, 
often life-shaping, choices.17 The same is often true in the 
information technology context, where technology users become 
vulnerable to those with whom they entrust important info-
rmation or functions.18 
2. Listeners’ Vulnerability in Relationships Where 
Speakers Exercise Physical, Economic, or Legal 
Control 
Even absent any relationship of trust, listeners become 
vulnerable to speakers when those speakers exert physical, 
legal, or economic control over them. The sorts of listeners 
subject to speakers’ dominion in these ways include those in 
 
 16. Deborah A. DeMott, Relationships of Trust and Confidence in the 
Workplace, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1255, 1259–60 (2015); see also id. at 1262 (ex-
plaining that fiduciary relationships are created when “[o]ne party, having been 
invited to do so, ‘reposed’ confidence in another and reasonably relied on the 
other’s superior expertise or knowledge”). 
 17. See Claudia Haupt, Licensing Knowledge, 72 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3151985 [https://perma.cc/ 
YM9J-LZ3T] (explaining that not all fiduciaries are professionals and not all pro-
fessionals are fiduciaries because the professional duty not to give bad advice is 
conceptually distinct from the fiduciary duty not to betray trust, even if the two 
duties sometimes overlap). 
 18. See Balkin, supra note 5, at 1186–87 (“Because of their special power over 
others and their special relationships to others, information fiduciaries have 
special duties to act in ways that do not harm the interests of the people whose 
information they collect, analyze, use, and distribute. . . . My goal, in other words, 
is to shift the focus of the First Amendment arguments about privacy from the 
kind of information to the kinds of relationships—relationships of trust and 
confidence—that governments may regulate in the interests of privacy.”); James 
Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868, 894 (2014) (“The 
alternative [to thinking about search engines as editors or conduits of speech] is 
listener-oriented: we could try to empower users to identify for themselves the 
speech they wish to hear.”). 
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government custody,19 patients in certain health care 
settings,20 and many workers.21 Listeners in these settings are 
less likely—and sometimes entirely unable—to question, rebut, 
or escape powerful speakers.22 
In short, listeners sometimes have less access to key infor-
mation than do speakers, sometimes listeners have less oppor-
tunity to resist or avoid speakers due to unequal power, and 
sometimes both are true. 
II. PROTECTING LISTENERS IN RELATIONSHIPS OF INEQUALITY 
When we adopt a listener-centered approach to certain free 
speech conflicts, we seek to prevent speakers from deceiving or 
coercing their less powerful listeners. Sometimes we do so by 
interpreting the First Amendment to permit government to 
regulate comparatively knowledgeable or powerful speakers. 
And sometimes we do so by protecting speech that is valuable 
to vulnerable listeners from the government’s interference. As 
we shall see, the government, like other powerful speakers,23 
 
 19. See Helen Norton, The Government’s Lies and the Constitution, 91 IND. 
L.J. 73, 92–93 (2015) (describing the power imbalances at work when law 
enforcement officials speak to those in government custody). 
 20. See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994) (“While 
targeted picketing of the home threatens the psychological well-being of the 
‘captive’ resident, targeted picketing of a hospital or clinic threatens not only the 
psychological but the physical, well-being of the patient held ‘captive’ by medical 
circumstance.”). 
 21. See Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace, supra note 3, at 64–67 
(explaining that employers control workers’ economic livelihood, which in turn 
also permits employers to control workers’ expression in significant ways and 
even to compel workers’ attendance at “captive audience” meetings); see also 
Matthew T. Bodie, Employment as Fiduciary Relationship, 105 GEO. L.J. 819 
(2017) (urging that employers should be considered their workers’ fiduciaries 
because of their power advantages). 
 22. A speaker’s physical, legal, or economic power over a listener often 
enables it to limit that listener’s voice (that is, her ability to engage in 
counterspeech) as well as exit (that is, her meaningful ability to walk away from 
the relationship and enter into another one at least as satisfactory). See ALBERT 
HIRSCHMANN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 30 (1970) (“Voice is here defined as any 
attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of 
affairs, whether through individual or collective petition to the management 
directly in charge, through appeal to a higher authority with the intention of 
forcing a change in management, or through various types of actions and protests, 
including those that are meant to mobilize public opinion.”). 
 23. See NEUBORNE, supra note 7, at 105 (“[P]ulling the government speech 
regulator completely out of the game does not mean that the flow of speech will 
become unregulated. If government is disabled from doing the job, someone else 
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can endanger listeners’ First Amendment interests: the gov-
ernment is both a potential regulator of others’ speech and a 
knowledgeable and powerful speaker itself.24 
A. Some Doctrinal Possibilities 
How can law protect listeners’ interests consistent with the 
First Amendment?25 Consider the following possibilities: 
1. Permitting the Government to Prohibit Powerful 
Speakers’ Lies or Misrepresentations 
Lies generally advance the speaker’s (that is, the liar’s) 
autonomy interests in saying what she wants to say at the 
expense of her listeners’ interests in receiving accurate 
information that enlightens their decision-making.26 A listener-
centered resolution of this conflict understands the First Amend-
ment to allow the government to impose higher expectations of 
honesty (no deliberate falsehoods) and even accuracy (no negli-
gent falsehoods, or perhaps even strict liability for falsehoods of 
 
will direct the speech traffic . . .—probably one or more powerful private speakers 
or conduits.”). 
 24. See Helen Norton, The Government’s Manufacture of Doubt, 16 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 342 (2018) (describing various ways in which the government 
may frustrate listeners’ interests through its own expressive choices). 
 25. See Neuborne, supra note 3, at 27 (“Nonetheless, the fact is that a signifi-
cant difference in substantive doctrine will, and should, exist between speaker-
dominated first amendment settings and hearer-dominated ones.”); id. at 29 
(“Although a healthy skepticism should surround any attempt by the government 
to assess the value of speech, the process of measuring instrumental value is less 
openly subjective than the selective apportionment of toleration that takes place 
in a speaker-centered setting. Accordingly, so long as the government censor’s 
persuasion burden is significant and so long as the government is utterly disabled 
from the kinds of self-interested censorship that are banned in speaker-centered 
settings, a government regulator in a hearer-centered setting should not be 
disabled from demonstrating that a given message diminishes a hearer’s capacity 
for informed and autonomous choice and is, therefore, unprotected.”). 
 26. See SCHEPPELE, supra note 8, at 177 (“[T]he effect of lies, half-truths, and 
failure to update information is to make the ignorant party think that she has the 
information and stop looking any further. Because she stops looking, the true 
information is effectively out of reach.”); WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 211 (“The 
falsification or suppression of information is an important limitation of liberty in 
itself and impedes the exercise of liberty in many areas.”). To be sure, the 
Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment sometimes protects lies from 
government regulation; this is especially the case where the Court perceives the 
lies to inflict little, if any, harm to listeners. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 
U.S. 709, 718–22 (2012) (plurality opinion); id. at 734–36 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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any kind).27 In other words, law sometimes requires speakers 
to tell the truth when they choose to speak on certain topics 
even if they would prefer to dissemble. For instance, law 
generally requires commercial actors to speak accurately when 
they extol their products’ attributes to consumers,28 profes-
sionals to accurately describe the risks of their recommended 
course of action to their patients and clients,29 and a corpo-
ration’s leaders to portray its economic situation truthfully 
when communicating with shareholders.30 
2. Permitting the Government to Require Powerful 
Speakers to Make Truthful Disclosures 
Powerful speakers’ nondisclosures also threaten listeners’ 
interests while enhancing their own. Scheppele describes the 
dangers that these nondisclosures, or secrets, pose to 
vulnerable listeners’ autonomy: 
Secrecy enables people to control others. To get another per-
son to do one’s will when that other person does not want to 
do so, one either can persuade the person with arguments or 
use physical coercion to force the person to do what one 
wants. But one may also hide the information that the other 
person would find relevant to making a decision, info-
rmation that would make the decision turn out differently. 
This is another, powerful invisible way of exercising control: 
by altering the appearance of a choice that the affected 
 
 27. See SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY, 
AND THE LAW 132 (2014) (“Regulating lies by experts about the contents of their 
actual, certified, or claimed expertise . . . attaches to a feature of the speaker and 
the relationship between the speaker and the utterance. This relationship is 
singled out as meriting regulation for content-independent reasons, namely that 
listeners should be able to rely upon the sincerity of experts because they have or 
claim special access to information that listeners either do not have, or reasonably 
should not be expected to cultivate on their own.”); Norton, Truth and Lies in the 
Workplace, supra note 3, at 76–84 (describing how the lies of powerful speakers 
threaten especially grave harm to their listeners). 
 28. See infra notes 50–58and accompanying text. 
 29. See infra notes 59–68and accompanying text. 
 30. E.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2018) (prohibiting materially false or mislead-
ing statements or omissions and requiring certain affirmative disclosures related 
to proxy elections). 
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person has to make, one can often effectively determine the 
outcome.31 
For this reason, more information—so long as it’s accurate 
and material—is often better for listeners.32 A listener-
centered approach thus understands the First Amendment to 
permit the government to require comparatively knowledgeable 
and powerful speakers to make accurate disclosures about 
certain matters, even if those speakers resist their discussion.33 
Illustrations include governmental requirements that 
commercial speakers affirmatively disclose the health or safety 
dangers posed by their products. As I’ve written in earlier 
work: 
This approach supports requirements that comparatively 
knowledgeable and powerful speakers make truthful disclo-
sures not only of important information to which they have 
unique (and perhaps exclusive) access, but also important 
information that the speakers are in the best position to 
communicate even though they might otherwise be loath to 
disclose for self-interested reasons. Think, for instance, of 
requirements that cigarette manufacturers post government 
health warnings on cigarette packages and advertisements 
where smokers are most likely to see them, as tobacco man-
ufacturers are uniquely well positioned to disseminate this 
important message—but unlikely to do so voluntarily.34 
 
 31. SCHEPPELE, supra note 8, at 304; see also id. at 5 (“[S]ecrets are also used 
as tools of power, wrenching advantage from the unknowing actions of others. 
What we don’t know often does hurt us—and serves to benefit others who kept us 
in the dark. Secrets provide the unobservable weapons of the devious. So while 
secrets enable the social world to be partitioned and individualized, making the 
expression of individual autonomy in the construction of the social world possible, 
they also serve as staging grounds for the deployment of power, assaults on the 
very autonomy that they constitute.”). 
 32. Often, but not always. See infra notes 35–39 and accompanying text. 
 33. See, e.g., Brass v. Am. Film Techs., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150–52 (2d Cir. 
1993) (discussing New York’s “superior knowledge” rule that requires sellers to 
make affirmative disclosures of fact to less knowledgeable buyers in certain 
circumstances). 
 34. Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace, supra note 3, at 69; see also 
Charlotte S. Alexander, Workplace Information-Forcing: Constitutionality and 
Effectiveness, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 487, 527 (2016) (“Workplace information-forcing 
rules may rightly target the employer because of this superior access to 
information. It is more efficient for the employer to transfer its knowledge to the 
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In other words, a listener-centered approach takes a func-
tional perspective to serving listeners’ interests by emphasizing 
the effective and timely delivery of accurate information to en-
lighten, but not coerce, listeners’ decision-making. 
3. Permitting the Government to Prevent Powerful 
Speakers from Coercing Listeners, and Preventing 
the Government from Coercing Listeners Itself 
But more speech is not always better for listeners who lack 
power.35 Speech that is neither false nor misleading can still 
frustrate listeners’ First Amendment interests when it is coer-
cive, as can be the case where speakers have the legal, 
physical, or economic power to punish their listeners’ resis-
tance. Coercive speech also takes place in “captive audience” 
environments where listeners have limited opportunity to 
rebut or escape speakers, as well as in certain relationships 
where speakers abuse their listeners’ trust.36 And sometimes 
the government threatens listeners’ interests by forcing them 
to listen to comparatively powerful speakers, speakers that can 
include the government itself. 
In these environments, a listener-centered approach pro-
tects vulnerable listeners from coercion by restricting how, 
 
worker, or to be the conduit for the government’s provision of knowledge, than for 
the less informed party to expend the resources in an attempt to inform him- or 
herself.”). 
 35. See Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to American 
Democracy), 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 200, 206–07 (2017) (explaining that cheap 
and plentiful speech sometimes poses new dangers to some listeners and to the 
public more broadly); Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete? (Columbia 
University Public Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 14-573 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3096337 
[https://perma.cc/VG4T-2X6N] (“The unfortunate truth is that cheap speech may 
be used to attack, harass, and silence as much as it is used to illuminate or 
debate.”). 
 36. As Caroline Mala Corbin has observed, listeners are “captive” if they 
cannot readily avoid the message and if they should not have to abandon the 
space to avoid the message. Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right 
Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 943–50 (2009) (identifying the 
home, public transportation, medical facilities, churches, funerals, and polling 
places as locations where audiences may be considered as captive); see also J.M. 
Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 2310–12 
(1999) (“Generally speaking, people are captive audiences for First Amendment 
purposes when they are unavoidably and unfairly coerced into listening. . . . 
Captivity in this sense is a matter of practicality rather than necessity. It is about 
the right not to have to flee rather than the inability to flee.”). 
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when, or where powerful speakers may address them. For 
instance, a listener-centered approach permits the government 
to forbid speakers from coercing listeners’ choices through 
threats, such as an employer’s threats of job loss or retaliation 
if workers assert their legal right to unionize.37 A listener-
centered approach also understands the First Amendment to 
allow the government to restrict speech that extracts listeners’ 
assent through intimidation or exhaustion.38 Along these lines, 
the Supreme Court upheld a governmental ban on attorneys’ 
in-person solicitation of potential clients, concluding that such 
expression threatened greater dangers of coercion than other 
types of attorney advertising: “[I]n-person solicitation may 
exert pressure and often demands an immediate response, 
without providing an opportunity for comparison or refle-
ction.”39 
Finally, a listener-centered approach interprets the First 
Amendment to bar the government itself from coercing less 
powerful listeners. Although decided on due process rather 
than free speech grounds, the Supreme Court’s canonical 
decision in Miranda v. Arizona exemplifies a listener-centered 
approach, recognizing listeners’ vulnerability at the hands of a 
speaker who exerts physical and legal control over them. The 
Court thus required powerful speakers (governmental law 
enforcement officials) to affirmatively disclose available consti-
tutional protections like the right to remain silent and the right 
to counsel; it did so to protect vulnerable listeners (the subjects 
of custodial interrogation) from deception and coercion. After 
emphasizing the listeners’ isolation and desperation, the Court 
concluded: 
 
 37. See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 
(1969) (emphasizing workers’ economic dependence on their employers when 
explaining that an employer’s threat of retaliation against workers was “without 
the protection of the First Amendment”). 
 38. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455–56 (1966) (“[T]he very fact of 
custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the 
weakness of individuals . . . .”); id. at 465 (“The entire thrust of police 
interrogation there, as in all the cases today, was to put the defendant in such an 
emotional state as to impair his capacity for rational judgment. The abdication of 
the constitutional privilege—the choice on his part to speak to the police—was not 
made knowingly or competently because of the failure to apprise him of his rights; 
the compelling atmosphere of the in-custody interrogation, and not an 
independent decision on his part, caused the defendant to speak.”). 
 39. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978). 
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[W]ithout proper safeguards the process of in-custody inter-
rogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains 
inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine 
the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak 
where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to 
combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to 
exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the 
accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his 
rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully 
honored. . . . For those unaware of the privilege, the 
warning is needed simply to make them aware of it—the 
threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its 
exercise. More important, such a warning is an absolute 
prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the 
interrogation atmosphere. It is not just the subnormal or 
woefully ignorant who succumb to an interrogator’s 
imprecations, whether implied or expressly stated, that the 
interrogation will continue until a confession is obtained or 
that silence in the face of accusation is itself damning and 
will bode ill when presented to a jury.40 
To be sure, the custodial interrogation setting offers an 
extreme example of captive listeners; less extreme illustrations 
include certain educational, employment, or health care set-
tings. For instance, the Court has held that the government’s 
prayer or other religious speech to kids as listeners in public 
schools can coerce students’ religious beliefs or practices in 
violation of the Establishment Clause—recognizing, as in 
Miranda, that psychological pressure can sometimes coerce 
vulnerable listeners as effectively as physical threats.41 For 
this reason, courts have held that in certain circumstances the 
Constitution constrains the government’s speech to protect its 
listeners from coercion;42 for related reasons courts have also 
held that the First Amendment sometimes—permits the gov-
 
 40. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467–68. 
 41. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992) (“This pressure, though 
subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion.”). 
 42. See Norton, supra note 19, at 92–96 (discussing how law enforcement 
officers’ lies to those in government custody are sometimes sufficiently coercive to 
violate the Due Process Clause). 
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ernment to regulate other powerful speakers to protect vuln-
erable listeners from coercion.43 
* * * 
These approaches permit the government to restrain 
knowledgeable and powerful speakers’ efforts to lie, hide, or 
coerce. Even so, a listener-centered perspective still leaves those 
speakers with the liberty to make a wide range of expressive 
choices: it does not force speakers to mouth opinions that they 
don’t hold, nor does it prohibit them from sharing their opin-
ions or additional accurate information of their choosing in 
noncoercive settings. 
B. Listener-Centered Relationships: Examples and 
Applications 
What does a listener-centered approach to First Amend-
ment doctrine look like in practice? First, as I’ve explained else-
where, a listener-centered focus can inform our choice of the 
appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied to the government’s 
decision to regulate comparatively knowledgeable or powerful 
speakers for listeners’ benefit.44 Courts can thus choose to 
defer, and apply rational-basis scrutiny, to the government’s 
listener-based regulatory choices. This is the case, as we’ll see, 
with the Court’s application of rational-basis review to the 
government’s compelled disclosures in the commercial speech 
setting.45 
Second, even if courts instead apply heightened scrutiny to 
the government’s regulatory choices, a listener-centered focus 
can inform their determination whether the government’s 
action survives that scrutiny. In other words, the government’s 
regulatory choices that inform and empower comparatively 
vulnerable listeners can satisfy not only rational-basis scrutiny 
but sometimes also intermediate or even more suspicious scru-
tiny.46 Examples here include the government’s restrictions on 
 
 43. See infra notes 50–68and accompanying text. 
 44. Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace, supra note 3, at 68. 
 45. See infra notes 53–54and accompanying text. 
 46. See Amicus Brief of American Medical Association in support of 
Respondents, Nat’l Inst. of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, No. 16-1140, 
2018 WL 1156609 (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to all regulation of 
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professional speech that survive intermediate scrutiny when 
they serve listeners’ interests.47 (Even in the campaign finance 
setting—which involves the regulation of speech in public dis-
course—the Court has applied exacting scrutiny to uphold laws 
that require political speakers and contributors to disclose 
themselves as the source of campaign contributions and com-
munications; it upheld these laws precisely because those 
disclosures serve listeners’ interests in knowing an expression’s 
source as a measure of its credibility.48 Similarly, the Court 
has held that the government’s regulation of campaign speech 
within one-hundred feet of polling places survives even strict 
scrutiny, finding it narrowly tailored to protect listeners—
there, voters—from coercion.49) 
Consider the following possible listener-centered relation-
ships; as we’ll see, some reflect current doctrine, while others 
would require changes to that doctrine. 
1. Commercial Actors’ Speech to Consumers 
The Supreme Court’s traditional commercial speech doc-
trine long exemplified a listener-centered approach.50 In a 
 
professional speech, but concluding that informed consent requirements survive 
such scrutiny, as well as the California law under challenge in Becerra). 
 47. E.g., King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014) (upholding 
state law that prohibited licensed counselors from engaging in sexual orientation 
conversion efforts therapy with clients under age eighteen). 
 48. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 366 (2010) (apply-
ing, and upholding, campaign disclosure requirements under “exacting” scrutiny 
in which the regulation must be substantially related to an important government 
interest); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (same). 
 49. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
 50. Here I focus on the Court’s “modern” commercial speech doctrine that 
emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. As many commentators have observed, however, 
in recent years the Court has departed from its earlier more listener-centered ap-
proach to commercial speech. See NEUBORNE, supra note 7, at 104–05 (“Modern 
free speech law rests on a slippery slope so precipitous that any step toward gov-
ernment speech regulation aimed at controlling dysfunctional speakers, 
improving the quality of choices for hearers, or reinforcing the Kantian dignity of 
hearers and speech targets is demonized by the Supreme Court as a first step 
toward tyranny.”); Wendy E. Parmet & Jason A. Smith, Free Speech and Public 
Health: Unraveling the Commercial-Professional Speech Paradox, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 
887, 890 (2017) (explaining how, in recent years, “the Court has given less weight 
to the interests of listeners, including their health interests”); Morgan N. Weiland, 
Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant Libertarian 
Speech Tradition, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1395 (2017) (explaining that under the 
Court’s more recent application of commercial speech doctrine, “listeners’ rights 
are subordinated to corporate speech rights. It is deeply ambiguous whether the 
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setting where commercial actors possess much more info-
rmation about their goods and services than do their consum-
ers, the Court interprets the First Amendment to permit the 
government to regulate speech that frustrates listeners’ 
interests while protecting speech that serves them. 
The Court treats commercial speech that is false, mislead-
ing, or related to illegal activity (like advertisements for illegal 
drugs) as entirely unprotected by the First Amendment 
because listeners (that is, consumers) have no constitutionally 
protected interest in receiving that information.51 For this 
reason, the Court has long interpreted the First Amendment to 
permit the government to prohibit commercial actors’ lies and 
misrepresentations about their products’ health-and-safety 
risks and many other matters.52 For the same reason, the 
Court has applied deferential rational-basis review to 
governmental requirements that commercial speakers make 
truthful disclosures about those matters:53 as an example, 
recall the federal statute requiring cigarette manufacturers to 
publish the Surgeon General’s warning prominently on their 
advertisements and packages.54 
At the same time, the Court generally protects truthful 
and non-misleading commercial speech from government reg-
ulation because that expression often provides great value to 
consumers’ decision-making.55 For this reason, the Court has 
applied intermediate scrutiny to strike down laws prohibiting 
sellers from publishing accurate information about legal prod-
ucts or services, information that includes the price of pres-
 
Court’s deregulatory holdings actually benefit listeners, though corporate 
interests are always served”). 
 51. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 562–64 (1980). 
 52. E.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993) (“[T]he State may ban 
commercial expression that is fraudulent or deceptive without further justifica-
tion.”). 
 53. E.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) 
(applying rational-basis test to uphold commercial disclosure requirements that 
serve consumers’ interests as listeners). 
 54. 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012). 
 55. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562–64. 
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cription drugs,56 the amount of alcohol in beer,57 and the 
availability of attorneys’ services.58 
2. Professionals’ Speech to Patients and Clients 
Professional speakers like doctors and lawyers enjoy ad-
vantages of both information and power over their patients and 
clients who rely on their recommendations when making im-
portant life decisions. As Claudia Haupt explains, professional 
speech involves individualized advice to a client or patient “tied 
to a body of disciplinary knowledge from which it gains au-
thority within a social relationship that is defined by 
knowledge asymmetry[,] . . . reliance[,] . . . and trust . . . .”59 
Patients and clients thus seek accurate information from their 
health care providers, lawyers, accountants, and other pro-
fessional experts about the risks and benefits of a proposed 
course of treatment or action that informs, but does not coerce, 
their decision about whether to undertake that course of 
conduct. Think, for example, of a patient considering the pros 
and cons of more and less invasive treatment regimens, or a 
client trying to decide whether to settle for pennies on the 
dollar rather than risk continued litigation. Law sometimes 
protects these listeners’ interests by protecting speech consi-
stent with professional standards from the government’s efforts 
to bend patients’ and clients’ choices in the government’s 
preferred direction, and sometimes by regulating the quality of 
professional speech to ensure its trustworthiness (and thus its 
value to listeners) through licensing regimes, professional 
responsibility requirements, and malpractice liability.60 
Although the Supreme Court has yet to settle on its First 
Amendment approach to professional speech,61 many lower 
 
 56. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizen Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
763 (1976). 
 57. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 489–90 (1995). 
 58. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
 59. Haupt, supra note 17, at 26; see also id. (“The client, in short, depends on 
a distinction between good and bad professional advice—a distinction that a strict 
regime of content- and viewpoint-neutrality would obliterate.”). 
 60. Id. (“But this presumption of speaker equality does not apply outside of 
public discourse where we continue to value facts and truth. One such area is pro-
fessional speech. . . . [L]istener interests are vitally important to professional 
speech where the very purpose of the professional-client relationship is to give 
accurate, comprehensive and reliable advice to the client.”). 
 61. See Nat’l Inst. of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
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courts to date have applied this sort of listener-centered ap-
proach to free speech problems in this setting. 
More specifically, we support listeners’ interests in receiv-
ing quality professional advice when we interpret the First 
Amendment to protect lawyers’ and doctors’ speech from gov-
ernmental restrictions that are inconsistent with professional 
standards. Governmental restraints along these lines include 
the federal regulation that forbade federally funded legal ser-
vices lawyers from representing clients challenging welfare 
laws even though professional standards generally require 
lawyers to vigorously pursue their clients’ plausible claims.62 
Or the Florida law that banned doctors’ discussions of gun 
safety with their patients even when professional standards 
encourage such conversations to prevent accidental injuries.63 
At the same time, we also promote listeners’ interests in 
receiving quality professional advice when we understand the 
First Amendment to permit the government to regulate profes-
sionals’ speech to ensure its consistency with the relevant body 
of professional knowledge. Law has long done so through 
licensing requirements that require demonstrated proficiency 
with the profession’s skills and standards before one can offer 
professional advice, as well as through the imposition of 
malpractice liability when professionals dispense advice that 
deviates from the discipline’s norms.64 Relatedly, professional 
ethics rules extensively regulate lawyers’ speech to protect 
clients’ interests, sometimes by prohibiting speech dangerous 
to listeners and sometimes by requiring affirmative disclosures 
of value to listeners. Consider, for example, the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct that require lawyers to disclose potential 
 
2367 (2018) (“In sum, neither California nor the Ninth Circuit has identified a 
persuasive reason for treating professional speech as a unique category that is 
exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles. We do not foreclose the 
possibility that some such reason exists. We need not do so because the licensed 
notice cannot survive even intermediate scrutiny.”). For additional discussion, see 
infra notes 76–88 and accompanying text. 
 62. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (striking down a 
governmental regulation forbidding attorneys employed by the Legal Services 
Corporation from representing clients in challenges to existing welfare law). 
 63. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1307 (11th Cir. 
2017) (en banc) (striking down state law that forbade doctors from asking patients 
about gun ownership). 
 64. See Haupt, supra note 17 (describing the government’s ex ante and ex post 
regulation of professional speech through licensing and malpractice liability). 
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conflicts of interest,65 that prohibit lawyers from knowingly 
making false statements of material fact or law,66 that regulate 
lawyers’ speech when describing their experience and practice 
areas,67 and that regulate lawyers’ descriptions of themselves 
and their firms.68 
3. Employers’ Speech to Workers 
The workplace features a communicative relationship in 
which employers enjoy advantages of both information and 
power over workers as listeners. As I’ve written elsewhere: 
[T]he employment relationship is riddled with information 
asymmetries: employers know considerably more than 
workers about the terms and conditions of employment, 
about current and future industry and economic projections, 
and—as repeat players with greater resources—about 
available legal protections. Moreover, workers also exper-
ience significant power disadvantage, as employers control 
over workers’ economic livelihood also permits them to 
control workers’ expression and sometimes even their 
physical liberty (e.g., by compelling workers’ attendance at 
“captive audience” meetings).69 
The employment relationship is thus one that justifies the 
choice to privilege workers’ First Amendment interests when 
they conflict with employers’. 
And conflict they often do. For instance, workers want 
employers to speak truthfully about their job security and pro-
spects for advancement, while employers sometimes seek to 
obfuscate.70 Some employers insist that workers listen to anti-
union speech at the workplace, while many workers resist such 
 
 65. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4, 1.7, and 1.9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2002). 
 66. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002). 
 67. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002). 
 68. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002). 
 69. Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace, supra note 3, at 37–38. 
 70. See Richard P. Perna, Deceitful Employers: Common Law Fraud as a 
Mechanism to Remedy Intentional Employer Misrepresentation in Hiring, 41 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 233, 234–38 (2005) (describing examples of workers’ detri-
mental “reliance on false statements or promises the employer made during pre-
hiring negotiations”). 
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“captive audience” meetings in which employers compel not 
only workers’ attendance but also sometimes their silence by 
threatening their jobs or by punishing their counterspeech.71 
And workers have a significant interest in receiving infor-
mation about their legal rights in the workplace, while some 
employers would prefer not to disclose that information. A 
listener-centered approach to the employment relationship 
resolves these conflicts by enabling the government to prohibit 
employers’ lies and misrepresentations about the terms and 
conditions of employment, to forbid employers from requiring 
workers to attend captive audience meetings on the perceived 
dangers of unionization, and to require employers to disclose 
accurate information about available legal protections. 
Applying a listener-centered approach in the employment 
setting would generate different results in a number of ongoing 
legal and policy disputes. For instance, a listener-centered ap-
proach would encourage the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) to rethink its longstanding unwillingness to regulate 
employers’ lies and misrepresentations, and to prohibit employ-
ers’ captive audience meetings, in union representation elec-
tions.72 In listener-centered relationships, listeners’ interests in 
the truth outweigh speakers’ interests in shading it, while lis-
teners’ interests in avoiding unwelcome speech trump speakers’ 
interests in addressing listeners in coercive environments. 
For the same reasons, a listener-centered approach ex-
plains why the D.C. Circuit was wrong to strike down, as 
 
 71. See Paul M. Secunda, Addressing Political Captive Audience Workplace 
Meetings in the Post-Citizens United Environment, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 17, 19–
22 (2010); see also id. at 39–43 (“Private-sector employers in the United States 
routinely hold mandatory workplace meetings during union organization 
campaigns to express antiunion views to their employees. Such captive audience 
speech occurs when employers require supervisors to convey management’s anti-
union opinions to their subordinates or when employers require employees to 
listen to the employer’s anti-union message at mandatory meetings during work 
time. In conversation with supervisors, employees risk being fired for 
insubordination if they refuse to listen to partisan advocacy; in the case of larger 
group meetings, employees may be terminated for refusing to attend anti-union 
assemblies. Indeed, employees can be lawfully terminated for merely asking 
questions of their employers during such a meeting or for leaving such meetings 
without permission. . . . [A] recent study indicated that employees were subject to 
nearly eleven captive audience meetings during an average union campaign.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 72. See Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace, supra note 3, at 42–43 
(describing the NLRB’s reluctance to regulate lies and misrepresentations in 
union representation elections). 
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infringing on employers’ protected speech, the NLRB’s require-
ment that employers post notice of workers’ National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) rights.73 Many workers would benefit 
from knowing that the National Labor Relations Act prohibits 
employers from punishing their concerted efforts to improve 
their pay or working conditions even in nonunionized work-
places.74 That the NLRA does so, however, remains a secret to 
most workers.75 Again, in listener-centered relationships, lis-
teners’ desires that speakers reveal accurate and material info-
rmation prevails over speakers’ interests in keeping that 
information to themselves. 
4. Service Providers’ Speech to Women Seeking 
Reproductive Health Care 
A listener-centered approach would also have generated a 
very different outcome in National Institute for Family and Life 
 
 73. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013), overruled in 
part on other grounds by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014). The D.C. Circuit struck down the NLRB’s notice-posting requirement 
even though many other employment statutes have long—and until recently, 
uncontroversially—required employers to post similar notices of workers’ legal 
rights. See Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace, supra note 3, at 68–76. 
 74. E.g., Custom Cut, Inc., 340 N.L.R.B. No. 17 (2003) (NLRB decision 
concluding that employer violated NLRA by retaliating against workers who 
discussed their pay with other employees); NLRB, Protected Concerted Activity: 
West Caldwell, New Jersey, https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/protected-
concerted-activity/west-caldwell-new-jersey [http://perma.cc/WK7W-ACPM] (dis-
cussing NLRB regional office decision for Cheese Processing Company, Case No. 
22-CA-061632 (2011), concluding that employer violated NLRA when it prohibited 
workers from discussing their pay with each other). 
 75. See, e.g., Peter D. DeChiara, The Right to Know: An Argument for 
Informing Employees of Their Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, 32 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 431, 433–34 (1995) (“In the non-union setting, employees’ 
ignorance leads to the underutilization of legitimate workplace protests, of the 
voicing of group grievances, and of requests for outside help from government 
agencies or other third parties. In sum, lack of notice of their rights disempowers 
employees.”). Workers’ lack of knowledge about their legal rights is by no means 
limited to the National Labor Relations Act. See Charlotte S. Alexander & Arthi 
Prasad, Bottom-Up Workplace Law Enforcement: An Empirical Analysis, 89 IND. 
L.J. 1069, 1093–95 (2014) (finding that fifty-nine percent of workers surveyed had 
inaccurate substantive knowledge of their rights under wage and hour law and 
seventy-seven percent had inaccurate procedural legal knowledge—that is, they 
did not know where to file a wage and hour complaint). Alexander and Prasad 
further found that “the least politically, economically, and socially powerful and 
secure workers were the least likely to have accurate substantive and procedural 
legal knowledge.” Id. at 1098–99. 
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Advocates v. Becerra.76 There, a 5-4 Supreme Court preliminar-
ily enjoined a California law that required crisis pregnancy 
centers to accurately describe available medical services when 
speaking to the pregnant women they seek to influence. 
Indeed, the Court’s decision in Becerra makes plain both the 
tensions between speakers’ and listeners’ First Amendment 
interests in the reproductive health-care setting, and the very 
different results that follow the choice to privilege speakers’ as 
opposed to listeners’ interests in that expressive relationship. 
California, like a number of other states and localities, 
required facilities that seek to serve pregnant women to 
disclose certain information to those women. First, it required 
those health care facilities licensed under state law to provide 
women with the government’s notice that “California has 
public programs that provide immediate free or low-cost access 
to comprehensive family planning services (including all FDA-
approved methods of contraception), prenatal care, and abor-
tion for eligible women. To determine whether you qualify, 
contact the county social service office at [insert phone number 
here].”77 Second, the state required unlicensed facilities to pro-
vide the government’s notice that “[t]his facility is not licensed 
as a medical facility by the State of California and has no 
licensed medical provider who provides or directly supervises 
the provision of services.”78 
Crisis pregnancy centers then brought a First Amendment 
challenge to California’s law. These centers are generally affili-
ated with or operated by organizations opposing abortion and 
offer a limited range of free services to pregnant women.79 
Most, if not all, of these centers do not offer referrals or any 
other services related to birth control or abortion, and many 
have no professional health care providers on staff.80 
Imagine that you are pregnant. You may know that you 
don’t want an abortion. You may know that you do. You may be 
unsure. If you’re like many (if not most), you want accurate in-
formation about available options and services before deciding 
your next step. You don’t want to be lied to, you don’t want 
 
 76. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 77. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123472(a)(1) (West 2016), preliminarily 
enjoined by Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361. 
 78. Id. § 123472(b)(1), preliminarily enjoined by Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361. 
 79. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2368. 
 80. Id. 
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relevant information withheld from you, and you don’t want to 
be bullied. Further, you want that information sooner rather 
than later, as delays create new health risks, limiting (and 
sometimes foreclosing altogether) some of your choices. When 
we take women’s interests as listeners seriously, then we 
understand the First Amendment to permit the government to 
require service providers to make truthful disclosures to the 
women whose choices they seek to shape. In other words, the 
reproductive health care setting justifies a listener-centered 
approach because it features inequalities of information: ser-
vice providers as speakers know more than their listeners 
about the services they do and don’t provide. 
The Becerra majority, however, ignored what women as 
listeners would find helpful in making key (and constitutionally 
protected) decisions about their health and lives. Focusing in-
stead on the centers as speakers and what they do and don’t 
want to say to the pregnant women they seek to influence, the 
Court failed to protect listeners’ autonomy, enlightenment, and 
self-governance interests—values at the heart of the Free 
Speech Clause. 
For example, after characterizing the California law as a 
content-based regulation of the centers’ speech,81 the majority 
then asserted that “this Court has not recognized ‘professional 
speech’ as a separate category of speech,” and instead described 
its precedent as affording “less protection for professional 
speech in two circumstances—neither of which turned on the 
fact that professionals were speaking.”82 These circumstances, 
according to the majority, involved the Court’s application of 
rational-basis review to “some laws that require professionals 
to disclose factual, noncontroversial information in their ‘com-
mercial speech’” as well as its affirmation of the government’s 
ability to “regulate professional conduct, even if that conduct 
incidentally involves speech.”83 After describing its past defer-
ential review of the government’s compelled disclosures as 
 
 81. The majority opinion did not discuss the fact that in certain settings the 
Court’s past precedent had indicated less suspicion of, and more deference to, 
governmental disclosure requirements that result in more speech than govern-
ment regulations that restrict, and thus reduce the amount of, available speech. 
E.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) 
(upholding commercial disclosure requirements as serving consumers’ interests as 
listeners). 
 82. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371–72. 
 83. Id. at 2372. 
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applying only to purely “factual and uncontroversial” disclo-
sures about the services that the speaker itself provides,84 the 
majority then distinguished California’s compelled disclosures 
as concerning the inherently controversial subject of abortion, 
and as directed to services that others (rather than the centers 
themselves) provide.85 
But again, a listener-centered approach would ask instead 
what information would serve reasonable listeners’ interests, 
privileging those listeners’ interests when in conflict with the 
speaker’s. Pregnant women considering their next steps are 
generally interested in accurate information about relevant 
services that can help them regardless of who provides those 
services.86 Relatedly, a listener-centered approach appropriat-
ely understands the Supreme Court’s precedent that calls for 
deferential review of the government’s compelled disclosure 
only of “purely factual and uncontroversial” information to 
mean “factually uncontroversial” or, more accurately, “factually 
uncontroverted” information.87 That California offers low-cost, 
sometimes free, medical services that include prenatal care, 
birth control, and abortion is an objectively verifiable, empiri-
cally uncontroverted fact. So too that unlicensed pregnancy 
crisis centers have no licensed medical providers on site. That 
some speakers would prefer not to talk about those facts—or 
would prefer that their listeners never learn of them—does not 
make them “factually controversial.” As I’ve written elsewhere: 
[U]nder the challengers’ view, a disclosure is impermissibly 
“controversial” for First Amendment purposes when one 
party does not want the matter discussed in a particular 
 
 84. Id. (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Common practice undermines the Becerra majority’s claim that the 
Court’s past precedent applying rational-basis review to the government’s 
compelled disclosures applies only to disclosures about the speaker’s “own 
services.” For example, some states require that health care professionals disclose 
accurate and material information about lawful treatment options even if they do 
not provide those services themselves. Examples include state and federal laws 
that require certain health care providers and facilities to inform patients or 
residents of their rights to execute advance health care directives, request 
palliative care, refuse potentially life-prolonging treatment, or (in jurisdictions 
where lawful) to end one’s suffering with the aid of a physician. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 
1395cc(f)(1) (2000); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1569.156(a)(3) (West 2018). 
 87. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (upholding commercial disclosure require-
ments as serving consumers’ interests as listeners). 
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way, or at all. Such an approach, however, would enable 
challengers to defeat listeners’ substantial informational 
interests simply by manufacturing controversy over what is 
accurate information. For example, such an approach would 
potentially treat the Surgeon General’s requirement that 
cigarette manufacturers display warnings about the 
dangers of tobacco as impermissibly one-sided and thus 
“controversial” in that it fails to note that smoking brings 
many people great pleasure and that some smokers live long 
and healthy lives. An approach more consistent with the 
protection of listeners’ First Amendment interests would 
thus understand “factual and uncontroversial” in this 
context to refer to assertions that are provable (or dis-
provable) as a factual matter in the same way required of 
contested assertions in defamation, perjury, and antifraud 
law. . . . In other words, here “uncontroversial” should mean 
factually or empirically uncontroversial rather than politi-
cally uncontested.88 
III. HARD QUESTIONS AND TOUGH CHOICES 
By proposing that listeners’ interests should carry the day 
when they conflict with speakers’ in certain expressive rela-
tionships of inequality, a listener-centered approach makes 
some hard First Amendment problems easier. At the same 
time, however, a listener-centered approach generates some 
difficult questions of its own. 
A. Identifying Limiting Principles 
Of course, speakers enjoy advantages of information and 
power over their listeners in a wide variety of relationships. 
Should we take the side of listeners in all of them? 
Consider the four sets of relationships described in Part II: 
commercial, professional, employment, and reproductive health 
care. All involve offers or exchanges outside of public discourse 
in which speakers enjoy advantages of information or power (or 
both) over their listeners. In each of them, the speaker seeks to 
shape his listeners’ choices in his preferred direction: to per-
suade them to buy what he’s selling; to settle rather than sue 
 
 88. Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace, supra note 3, at 74–75. 
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or to wait rather than operate (or vice versa); to take, keep, or 
leave a job; or to continue a pregnancy. All involve the 
speaker’s delivery of information that is objectively verifiable: 
the attributes of a particular product, the professional consen-
sus about a course of medical treatment or legal action, the 
terms and conditions of employment or the availability of legal 
protections in the workplace, and the existence and extent of 
available reproductive health care services. And all involve 
listeners who are making decisions (often life-shaping decis-
ions) about their property or persons.89 
But we can readily think of a number of other expressive 
relationships that involve informational and power inequalities 
yet where we may worry about the First Amendment implica-
tions of protecting listeners’ interests at the expense of speak-
ers’. (Again, I put aside for now speech that occurs in tradi-
tional public discourse, like campaign and other political 
speech.)90 Consider, for instance, the speech of family, friends, 
or intimate partners to and among each other in relationships 
of trust, and sometimes vulnerability.91 For a variety of 
reasons, some may be reluctant to privilege listeners’ First 
Amendment interests in these settings by prohibiting lies, by 
requiring certain disclosures, or by prohibiting potentially coer-
cive speech. Some may hope for, and thus prefer to presume, 
equality between these speakers and listeners even if that is 
not always the case. Relatedly, some may think that listeners 
in these relationships are unlikely to suffer significant harm, or 
may think that they can protect their own interests through 
skepticism or counterspeech. Some may fear that the 
 
 89. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Lies, Line Drawing, and (Deep) Fake News, 71 
OKLA. L. REV. 59, 75–77 (2018) (explaining that because a traditional function of 
government is to protect us from harm to our persons and property, the 
government may have greater First Amendment leeway to regulate speech that 
threatens such harm). 
 90. See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text. 
 91. See Ethan Lieb, Friends as Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 665, 732 
(2009) (“The fiduciary concept recognized by our law is a flexible one. I have 
argued here that it is flexible enough to encompass enforcement of certain duties 
of friendship that we all know well from our moral lives. Friendship—of a certain 
sort, to be sure—is undoubtedly a relationship of trust and vulnerability, and 
fiduciary law is set up specifically to give effect to and frame this sort of special 
relationship. . . . Nothing I have argued for here suggests that all friends qualify 
for fiduciary treatment; rather, courts must not fear that there is some category 
mistake being made by those claiming fiduciary duties from their friends or 
former friends.”). 
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government’s regulation of speech in these settings threatens 
to chill valuable expression among these parties. Some may 
doubt that law is a good way to generate or maintain trust in 
these relationships even if they think that law has a helpful 
role to play in policing other, less intimate sorts of relation-
ships. (Even so, note that law sometimes regulates communi-
cations among family members or intimate partners where 
information or power asymmetries threaten certain specific 
harms.)92 
In short, we may feel that some inequalities between 
speakers and listeners are less unfair or objectionable than 
others, or that the unintended consequences of addressing 
some expressive inequalities are especially grave.93 Although 
our intuitions about these matters may well differ, these 
intuitions, in turn, offer potential limiting principles for 
identifying the universe of expressive inequalities that justify a 
listener-centered approach. For instance, Jane Bambauer has 
proposed (in the informational privacy context) that a speaker’s 
fiduciary responsibilities should be triggered only when the 
speaker has affirmatively induced a listener’s trust through its 
assurances that it will not disclose or abuse listeners’ private 
 
 92. See Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Ct. App. 1984) (imposing 
tort liability for the defendant’s deception that led to the transmission of a 
sexually transmissible disease); Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Ct. 
App. 1983) (imposing tort liability on the defendant for knowingly 
misrepresenting himself to be sterile before engaging in intercourse with the 
plaintiff that resulted in her ectopic pregnancy); Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child 
Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 675–76, 
716–18 (2006) (explaining that law rarely regulates parents’ speech to their 
children despite “[t]he speaker’s legally enforced despotism, and the captive, 
immature, and vulnerable listener,” but noting an exception with respect to 
speech that “undermines the child’s relationship with the other parent” in certain 
child custody disputes). 
 93. Many of us are more interested in some types of inequalities than others, 
sometimes (but not always) based on self-interest or the limits of experience. 
Many Revolution-era Americans, for example, were fiercely committed to the 
notion that Americans should have the same rights as Englishmen—but not at all 
interested in inequalities involving race, sex, and wealth. EDMUND S. MORGAN, 
BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC 1763–89, 93–94 (3d ed. 1992); see also Mary Anne 
Franks, Injury Inequality, in INJURY AND INJUSTICE: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF 
HARM AND REDRESS 239 (Anne Bloom et al. eds., 2018) (“The selective deployment 
of the First Amendment is one of the barest expressions of injury hierarchy. 
Speech harms that implicate financial, business, and judicial interests are viewed 
as extremely serious. Speech harms that implicate other interests, such as racial 
or gender equality, are viewed as trivial.”). 
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information.94 Thinking about the hard problem of limiting 
principles can help us identify which expressive inequalities we 
find most troubling, and why. 
B. Determining Listeners’ Interests 
Even if we agree to privilege listeners’ interests within a 
certain communicative relationship, we may still disagree as to 
whether we serve listeners’ interests by protecting expression 
or instead by regulating it. For instance, we can imagine 
debates over what sort of information listeners reasonably 
want in various contexts, as some objectively verifiable facts 
may strike us as more material to their decision-making than 
others. 
Moreover, listeners’ autonomy interests sometimes clash 
with those of other listeners. Consider trolling, for instance, 
which involves the deliberate online posting of outrageous or 
otherwise objectionable commentary simply to provoke a reac-
tion.95 As I’ve discussed elsewhere, “[a]lthough the trolls’ 
targets find this speech of no value and often of great harm, 
some number of the trolls’ listeners include other members of 
the trolling community who consider trolling to be enjoyable 
precisely because others find it so unpleasant.”96 These ten-
sions again force us to make some hard choices: when listeners’ 
interests conflict with each other, which listeners should come 
first? In close cases, we might choose a tiebreaker that reflects 
our own preferred hierarchy of First Amendment values (which 
then offers additional opportunities for disagreement). For 
example, those who believe that the First Amendment’s 
primary purpose is to facilitate democratic self-governance may 
privilege some listeners’ self-governance interests over other 
listeners’ autonomy interests when the two are in conflict—as 
may be the case, for example, when robot trolls deliver inflam-
matory falsehoods to influence election outcomes in ways that 
 
 94. See Jane Bambauer, The Relationships Between Speech and Conduct, 49 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1941, 1951–52 (2016) (“If the state could identify and regulate 
a fiduciary relationship any time one person trusted another person or firm, the 
results would trouble even the most hardcore privacy advocate.”). 
 95. See WHITNEY PHILLIPS, THIS IS WHY WE CAN’T HAVE NICE THINGS: 
MAPPING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ONLINE TROLLING AND MAINSTREAM 
CULTURE 2 (2016). 
 96. See Helen Norton, Robotic Speakers and Human Listeners, 41 SEATTLE U. 
L. REV. 1145, 1148 (2018). 
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deceive some listeners while delighting others.97 Or one might 
instead prefer James Grimmelmann’s suggestion that “[l]isten-
er choices for speech trump listener choices against speech 
when the two conflict.”98 Again, we possess a variety of tools for 
resolving these conflicts even though we may disagree about 
which tool we prefer. 
Finally, readily identifiable speaker-listener relationships 
comprise only a part of the larger First Amendment web of 
communicative relationships. For instance, speech sometimes 
takes the form of free-flowing conversation in which character-
izing some participants as listeners and others as speakers is 
far from easy.99 To be sure, the more that conditions of equality 
render the exchange a true dialogue between the parties, the 
less the need for a listener-centered approach in that setting. 
But when some parties to the exchange suffer disadvantages of 
information or power, they may be considerably less likely than 
their partners to describe their experience as a conversation. A 
listener-centered approach can acknowledge the diversity of ex-
pressive relationships even while counseling that we affirma-
tively investigate whether an environment is one of equality, 
rather than simply assume that it is.100 
 
 97. See Nathaniel Persily, Can Democracy Survive the Internet?, 28 J. 
DEMOCRACY 63, 70 (2017) (“[B]ots can spread information or misinformation, and 
can cause topics to ‘trend’ online through the automated promotion of hashtags, 
stories, and the like. During the 2016 campaign, the prevalence of bots in 
spreading propaganda and fake news appears to have reached new heights.”). 
 98. James Grimmelmann, Listeners’ Choices, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 365, 392 
(2019) (“The unwilling listener in a one-to-one case can have her choice not to be 
spoken to respected, while the unwilling listener in a one-to-many case will have 
to put up with the unwanted speech.”). 
 99. See LEVY & ORR, supra note 7, at 78 (“To some extent, deliberative notions 
of expression even muddy the coherence of the speaker-listener distinction, since 
in the ideal deliberative forum everyone speaks and everyone listens.”). 
 100. For these reasons, we might best describe these relationships as reflecting 
a continuum rather than try to sort them into mutually exclusive categories. See 
Richards & Hartzog, supra note 14, at 458 (“But the law need not face the binary 
choice of treating information relationships as either Fiduciary or Unprotected. 
Surely some middle ground exists between these two extremes. . . . In 
relationships where vulnerabilities are minimized because there is only a small 
amount of trust, these remedies should be applied sparingly or lightly. Where 
there is greater trust (or greater potential for exposures), entrustees should be 
held to higher duties of care and loyalty. Rather than relying on a rigid 
fiduciary/non-fiduciary distinction, we propose a more flexible approach that 
recognizes the role of trust in all information relationships.”). I too want to resist 
formal categories and instead look at the functional relationships between 
speakers and listeners. See Norton, supra note 8, at 575 (“Efforts to articulate 
employers’ legal duties of honesty and accuracy should thus be informed by a 
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CONCLUSION 
A listener-centered approach doesn’t solve all free speech 
problems. Instead, it supplies a different and often helpful 
framework for thinking about some of them.101 When we turn 
our attention from speakers to listeners, we see that listeners 
in some expressive relationships suffer disadvantages of infor-
mation or power that undercut their First Amendment auton-
omy, enlightenment, and self-governance interests. 
When we adopt a listener-centered approach, we thus focus 
on a different set of questions than when we frame our inquiry 
around speakers’ interests. What do listeners reasonably want 
from speakers in relationships of expressive inequality? Listen-
ers generally seek accurate information that informs, but does 
not coerce, their decision-making. This is the case for decisions, 
among others, about whether to buy certain products or 
services, whether to embark on a certain medical or legal 
course of action, whether to take or leave a job or seek impro-
ved working conditions, and whether to continue or terminate a 
pregnancy. The higher the stakes for the listener, the more 
severe the consequences of deception and coercion.102 When we 
take listeners’ interests seriously in these relationships, we 
improve the quality of the communicative discourse, and we 
recognize listeners as ends in themselves—rather than as mere 
means through which powerful speakers seek to achieve their 
own ends. 
 
 
functional, rather than formalist, understanding of the information and power 
dynamics within this relationship.”). 
 101. See Burt Neuborne, The Status of the Hearer in Mr. Madison’s 
Neighborhood, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 897, 900 (2017) (“Even if, however, 
most outcomes remained the same, taking the interest of all participants in the 
speech process seriously would deepen First Amendment analysis.”). 
 102. See Haupt, supra note 10, at 1271 (explaining that the dangers of 
informational asymmetries “are exacerbated when the client’s personal health or 
freedom or significant financial interests are at stake”). 
